Understanding Parliamentarians: Individual Goals and Behaviour in European Legislatures

For decades, the analysis of parliaments in parliamentary democracies focused on political parties (assumed to behave as unitary actors) and neglected any investigation of the behaviour and motivations of individual parliamentarians. As a consequence, we know very little, theoretically or empirically, about the goals and motivations of parliamentarians in Europe. The workshop aims to overcome this deficit by exploring the behaviour, interests and incentives of individual parliamentarians in various European parliaments. First, we aim to systematically map individualized behaviour in European parliaments across parliamentary activities, countries, and time. Second, we aim to take first steps towards theoretical and empirical explanations of the causes of individualization. Third, we aim to explore the consequences of individualization for our understanding of the role political parties and individual MPs in making representative democracy work. Given this, the workshop will focus on the following empirical and theoretical questions: (1) What does the institutional incentive and opportunity structure for individualized behaviour (as determined for example by factors like parliamentary rules, electoral rules, promotional prospects, and individual resources) look like across countries and time? (2) To what extent do we observe individualized behaviour in European parliaments and how does this sort of behaviour vary across countries, time, and activities (for example in terms of voting, initiatives, speeches, questions, campaigning, communication with voters…)? (3) Can institutional incentives and opportunity structures [our first question] explain observed behaviour [our second question]? (4) What are the consequences of individualized behaviour for parliamentary processes, parliamentary outcomes, the role of political parties, and ultimately our understanding of representative parliamentary democracy?