In the previous decade, the relationship between the electoral system and parliamentarians’ behavior has received increasing attention (see for example Saalfeld, 2011; Slapin and Proksch, 2010). However, the relationship between the electoral system and parliamentarians’ preferences for a specific design of the rules regulating this behavior has been left largely unexplored.
I will fill this gap both theoretically and empirically by analyzing how the rules of parliamentary publicity are designed. I will ask “In how far does the design of the instruments of parliamentary publicity reflect the preferences of individual parliamentarians?” To answer this question, I will provide the first model which connects a country’s electoral system with the goals of individual parliamentarians regarding the institutional design of parliamentary publicity. Individual parliamentarians care about the design of these instruments because they have electoral consequences.
I will deduce that the more personalized an electoral system is, the more will individual parliamentarians prefer rules which grant them autonomy from their parliamentary party for employing the instruments of parliamentary publicity. Further, I will argue that the instruments of parliamentary publicity are either open or closed, depending on their participation restrictions and rules for interaction. Building on this, I will deduce that the relationship between the personalization of an electoral system and parliamentarians’ autonomy for employing the instruments of parliamentary publicity is stronger for closed than for open instruments.
Empirically, I will present the first systematic assessment of the rules of publicity in Western European parliaments. Following Sieberer et al. (2011), I will hereby rely on the rules set out in the parliamentary standing orders. I will highlight how the 2010 instruments of parliamentary publicity differ between selected Western European countries. Also, I will use this data to evaluate the hypotheses put forth in the theoretical section.
