This paper analyzes the institutional determinant of individual legislative behavior using a cross-national survey of MPs. It focuses on the institutional incentives for individual versus collective behavior, namely those found in the electoral system, the candidate selection method and the interplay between them.
The paper begins by delineating the effects of electoral systems and candidate selection methods on legislative behavior, noting that most of the research in the field tends to completely ignore, or at best to underestimate, the effect of the latter. It then argues that the influence of either the electoral system, or the candidate selection method, on legislative behavior depends on the nature of the relationship between these two. That is, the effect of one depends on the type, or kind, of the other.
The paper then shifts to comparative standardized data from ten European countries in order to provide evidence on how these inter- and intra-party institutional arrangements construct and constrain individual legislative behavior. Two dependent variables are used to specify legislative goals and behavior: party agreement and party loyalty. These variables allow us to learn about the decision making process that legislators employ when determining their behavior in parliament, hence exploring the consequences of individual legislative behavior in what the literature assumes is largely a collective sphere.
The paper thus addresses the main objectives of the workshop as it provides not only information on legislators' individual attitudes and behavior but also suggests institutional explanations for the respective views, using comparative data and addressing the possible consequences for political parties and party unity.
