What do MPS maximise? There is a serious lack in the relevant literature on parliamentarians: what do they want to achieve? Not that there would be any lack of alternative theories or suggestions. What is lacking is the serious demonstration of what candidates in parliamentary elections and elected representatives really want to aim at. According to the vote-seeking –model (Downs 1957, Enelow & Hinich 1984, Ordershook 1986, Cox 1987), what politicians really aim at is to maximise their vote. According to the policy-seeking –model (De Swaan 1973), politicians care for policy outcomes and try to achieve those states of affairs they prefer: they try to maximise their impact on public policy. According to the office seeking – model (Leiserson 1968, Riker 1962), politicians maximise their control of public office and the spoils they derive from such control: they seek to get into positions from which they can control politics. Most of the models operate on the level of parties seen as rather unitary actors. The models are designed to explain and predict competitive party behaviour and model electoral competition as well as coalition building. However, parliamentary candidates and elected representatives need not be in any ideological or behavioural agreement with their party. Party cohesion or party unity need neither be automatic nor perfect. Parties can be heterogeneous to the extreme. We also need theories that explain and predict behaviour on the individual level. This paper aims at achieving a better understanding of the incentive structures of individual parliamentary candidates and elected representatives by discussing the following, often stated but never proved provocative thesis: MPs are slack maximizers.
