Using a comparative institutional theory of parliamentary speech (Proksch and Slapin 2012), this paper examines the German 2011 parliamentary debate on the extension of the Euro rescue package. During this debate on one of the most important pieces of recent legislation, dissenting members of the governing parties spoke against the party line the floor of parliament. This became possible after the president of parliament decided to grant them extra speaking time against the plans of the party leadership to keep dissenting opinions off the floor. This paper provides an explanation for the drastically different reactions of political elites and the media about the debate, shows how a simple intra-party speech model can explain MPs’ participation in the debate, and compares the Euro rescue package debate to the overall debate participation of German members of parliament. The paper concludes by discussing general partisan and institutional constraints on parliamentary debate and how political institutions would need to change in order for intra-party dissent to become heard on the floor of parliament.
