In person icon Constitutive Arguments and Kantian Constructivism

Abstract

Recent work on the nature of normative requirements (both practical and theoretical) has exhibited a significant turn toward constitutive arguments. Among others, Christine Korsgaard, J. David Velleman, and Connie Rosati, have identified this argumentative strategy as a promising response to skeptical challenges. These philosophers share the view that certain features (principles, aims, etc.) are constitutive of belief and action. Since engaging in the activities of believing and acting seems inescapable, one can generate the normative (some claim, even moral) bindingness of the aforementioned features for all agents. This variety of a broadly Kantian constructivism has been criticized by moral realists, most recently and most prominently by David Enoch. Our suggestion is to discuss the current state of this debate (especially the exchange between Velleman and Enoch), firstly, by examining the extent to which constitutivism is correctly categorized as a form of constructivism and, secondly, whether or not it is a form of Kantian constructivism. With regard to the latter, we especially welcome investigations of the claim, often made but seldom substantiated, that Kant’s works provide the resources for contemporary constitutivism.

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