The aim of this paper is to stake out which view of self-reflection a constitutivist view must undertake to meet its metaethical aim of providing a foundation for morally normative requirements, where these requirements are either constructivist or moral realist in nature. To do so I will begin by determining what the object of self-reflection is—that is, whether it is an idealized conception of oneself, the principles upon which one acts, and/or one’s status as a rational agent. I will then determine the nature of the process of self-reflection that constitutivism must endorse. To do so, I will consider whether self-reflection is best understood in proceduralist term, in contentful terms or as some form of reflective equilibrium. I will conclude by considering whether we can, to use David Enoch’s terms (2006; 2009) “opt out” of self-reflection and still maintain the metaethical promise that constitutivism has.
