Kant and Kantian Constructivism in Moral and Political Philosophy

Section Topic Kantian constructivism is one of the most recent and important developments in political and moral theory. Introduced by John Rawls in his seminal article “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, the term was meant to refer to a position that avoided the problems Rawls had previously identified in utilitarianism and intuitionism. (Rawls 1980) Constructivism was also meant to address some for the difficulties Rawls had earlier identified in Kant’s moral theory (which for Kant included both ethics and juridical/political philosophy). (Rawls [1971] 1999). In particular, Rawls questioned Kant’s claim to a need for metaphysics, which political and juridical philosophy cannot do without, if they are to account for the moral necessity of principles of right and laws (for instance, in Kant RL 6: 355). Similar concerns were also discussed by many other contemporary influential philosophers. For instance, starting from his discourse ethics, Jürgen Habermas’s examination of legal norms in Between Facts and Norms (1996 [1992]) offers a constructivist account of legal normativity. This account tries to steer a path between legal positivism and natural law theory, in order to put forward a theory that can explain both the objectivity of legal norms and their capacity to be relevant in situations of pluralism characteristic for today’s modern democracies. During the last three decades, the debates around constructivism have raged and continue to preoccupy moral and political theorists. Such debates have also produced alternative theories that attempt to improve on constructivism – for instance, constructionism (Krasnoff 1999), constructivist contractualism (Timmons 2003) or constitutivism (Korsgaard 2008). Debates have concerned metaphysical issues concerning the nature of values and norms, epistemological issues with regard to the possibility of knowing such values and norms, and metaethical issues about the justification of such norms and values. The proposed section will explore the most significant debates and their political implications in relation to a range of concrete questions, including: human rights, welfare, citizenship, property, human imperfection and legal legitimacy. The section is designed to evaluate the prospects of Kantian constructivism and of Kant’s seminal political texts. Section Organisers: Sorin Baiasu (Vienna/Keele) Alice Pinheiro-Walla (Dublin) Howard Williams (Aberystwyth) References The reference to Kant is to: RL – Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre with the volume and page number from the German edition of Kant’s works, Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, subsequently Deutsche, now Berlin-Brandenburg Akademie der Wissenschaften (originally under the editorship of Wilhelm Dilthey). Berlin: Georg Reimer, subsequently Walter de Gruyter, 1900 – . Habermas, J. (1996 [1992]) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Tr. W. Rehg. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Korsgaard, C. (2008) The Constitution of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Krasnoff, L. (1999) “How Kantian Is Constructivism?”, in Kant Studien. 90 (3): 385-409. Rawls, J. (1999 [1971]) A Theory of Justice. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (1980) “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, in Journal of Philosophy. 77: 515-72. Timmons, M. (2003) “The Limits of Moral Constructivism”, in Ratio 16(4): 391-423.