Law and Courts
Democracy
Institutions
Courts
Judicialisation
Endorsed by the ECPR Standing Group on Law and Courts
Abstract
Contemporary political controversies in some countries recently have put the authority of the national and international courts into question. At the domestic level, we have observed how governments in Eastern Europe, in particular Hungary and Poland, have increasingly and notably in recent years attacked the rule of law to narrow the independence of their judiciaries. Internationally, we have also seen in recent years a backlash against international and regional courts. In this regard, international judicial institutions have become a target of populist governments eager to preserve their sovereignty from what they consider an illegitimate intervention in domestic affairs.
These current events not only illustrate how law and courts are deeply political, but also that research on courts is especially timely and important. This section proposes to examine in detail the politics of law and courts, addressing themes like the policy-making role of courts and the judicialisation of politics. This section proposal builds on the success of the Law and Courts sections at the Oslo and Hamburg general conferences:
1) Courts and inter-branch relations: Courts affect, and are affected by, decisions of other branches of power. This is true at both domestic and international levels. This panel invites papers which examine how courts' actions are shaped by responses of other branches. In particular, we welcome papers which look at how courts use incremental (strategic) or moderating (tactical) logics in their rulings in the face of statements by the executive or the legislature, or their international equivalents in the case of international and regional courts. In this panel, we welcome papers that look at such tactics in a broader perspective.
2) The policy-making role of courts: International and domestic courts in general have a vital role in shaping everyday policies. Although judicial decisions can often seem narrowly technical, recent years have shown how judge and litigant characteristics can shape outcomes in areas as disparate as taxation, welfare, and asylum. This panel provides an opportunity for scholars to link detailed court decisions to broad "political" factors.
3) Compliance and effectiveness of courts: In the 1830s, US President Andrew Jackson, angered by a decision of the Supreme Court, is reported to have said "[Chief Justice] Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!" In line with Jackson’s sentiments of the day, it is now widely understood that courts lack the coercive authority to compel compliance. Some courts nonetheless generate compliance, even though their counterparts may not. The difference in compliance raises questions what are the factors adding to compliance with courts’ decisions, and when and under what conditions the courts on their own are able to ensure compliance and enforce their decisions. This panel welcomes original perspectives on studying compliance with domestic and international courts.
4) Judicialisation of politics and politicization of courts: Politics has been judicialized, and politicians have reacted by politicizing the courts. This panel goes beyond this common-place statement, and invites papers that examine the mechanisms of politicisation and/or judicialisation. This may include an analysis of appointment mechanisms, litigation strategies, or referral behaviour. Alternately, papers might explore the judicialisation of politics through, among other things, analysis of legislative discourse or social mobilization.
5) Courts in non-democratic and transitional systems: Scholars of non-democratic regimes have become increasingly interested in the institutions that operate authoritarian and transitioning states. Courts are one of those institutions. Their presence can play a particularly important role, allowing regimes to signal that - though they may not allow political contestation - they are prepared to commit to the rule of law in "safe" spheres of life. Courts also play an important role in countries transitioning towards democracy, by guarding against backsliding and monitoring transitions which result from elite-level pacts. We welcome papers which explore these topics, particularly those that explore the topic in a comparative perspective.
6) Data and methods in law and courts research: Digitalisation holds great promise for law and courts research, offering a quick and cheaper alternative for collecting, classifying and analyzing large collections of documents. While Automated Content Analysis methods have not yet reached the point at which they can fully replace human reading of the text, they hold a great prospect of enhancing the scope of legal research. In this panel, we welcome papers which use innovative qualitative or quantitative methods to study the problems that are peculiar to courts, particularly insofar as they relate to legal language, symbolism, and voting decisions. Although we identify these areas, we are open to any exciting or innovative methodology which helps us better understand legal systems, courts and their work.
7) Law, Courts, and Society: Law and courts are often depicted as a domain for specialists, characterised by a certain language and set of rules that are too difficult to be understood by common citizens. This panel questions this statement by deepening the relationship between law, courts, justice professionals and society. We are interested in contributions dealing with the way in which the citizens’ perception of and relation to law and courts is shaped (direct or secondary experience of courts and court professionals, media, public opinion). We welcome contributions adopting qualitative and quantitative perspectives on the analysis of law, courts and society relations, particularly (but not exclusively) those contributing to the debate through theoretical approaches inspired by procedural justice theory, legal consciousness studies, legal socialisation, among others.
8) Politics and Courts Europe: Recent political backlash against constitutional courts seems to have become a general phenomenon in several European countries. This backlash presupposes that courts have assumed enough power to generate a reaction among dominant political actors—but the degree to which this power and authority has actually constrained these dominant actors has not yet been systematically examined. This panel will answer the general question: to what extent have courts constrained the legislature's room for manoeuvre in politically salient issues? Four country studies will elucidate whether courts have indeed stalled highly important policy processes, or whether this is a misleading narrative propagated by legislative majorities.