The proliferation of autonomous public institutions across various policy sectors has raised important questions about their institutional independence. This study explores the concept of institutional independence as a form of political delegation, where decision-making responsibilities are transferred to public entities designed to function autonomously from elected officials. While significant research has focused on specific cases such as central banks, regulatory agencies, and judicial councils, a comparative, cross-sectoral framework remains underdeveloped. This paper aims to discuss similarities and differences on the conceptualization of agency independence across different literatures, both on their de jure (legal) and de facto (practical) dimensions. Identifying key dimensions such as appointment rules, tenure security, decision-making autonomy, and external interference, we suggest that a common core can be identified, although different theoretical approaches shape what is considered most relevant for the measure of agency independence. Ultimately, the research will contribute to a deeper understanding of how independent institutions function within democratic systems and the extent to which they can resist political pressures while maintaining accountability and legitimacy.
