How does the radical right in the United States and Europe interpret multipolarity? This paper shows that the radical right in the North Atlantic differ on their interpretation of the world order. A focal point for their respective thinking on the world order has been their perspectives of the Russo-Ukraine War. They broadly agree with far-right Europeans on ending the Ukraine war, but they do so for different reasons. This paper argues that the US radical right’s attitude to China is the main organizing the principle behind their interpretation of the world and development of US foreign policy. Their commitment to contain China, specifically its military power, helps to explains its criticism about continuing the funding to Ukraine and of European defense, their political campaign against ‘wokeism’ in the military, climate change denialism, and even their anti-monopoly politics. For them, it requires a full-national response. The European radical right has ideological sympathies with Putin/Russian nationalism, anti-Americanism or anti-war traditions, or support the war’s end for economic interests. But what is absent from them is the threat from China which leads them to think in more multipolar terms about the world order. The US and European radical right both pursue political campaigns against wokeism and liberal progressive politics and to “re-masculinize” politics but do so for different ends. In the US it is about China, in Europe it is about securing domestic order. A thread throughout the paper is that the radical right in Europe is much more ideologically diverse than in the US, and they are much more radical and revisionist in their interpretation of the world order.
