Lobbyist-Turned-Official: Tracing the Impact of Private Ties in Public Office

Research on the revolving door phenomenon—where public office holders are hired by interest groups, or interest group representatives transition into public office—has traditionally focused on measuring the prevalence of this practice. Studies have highlighted significant variation across branches of government and political systems. Another strand of research has explored whether businesses derive economic benefits from hiring “revolvers”. More recently, scholars have demonstrated that employing former public office holders can indeed enhance interest groups’ access to major decision-making venues, particularly during the agenda-setting phase. However, much of this more recent research has concentrated exclusively on the European Commission, examining whether interest groups benefit from the political networks of their government recruits. In this study, on the private-to-public movement: we investigate whether public office holders with a lobbying background engage more frequently with lobbyists than those without such a background. To address this question, we move beyond the EU context, using data from the lobbying registry of British Columbia, Canada. This dataset includes all lobbying registration returns filed since 2010, providing a broad temporal horizon. Specifically, we test whether public office holders in 2024 with prior lobbying experience report more frequent contacts with lobbyists compared to their counterparts who were not previously listed in the lobbying registry. This focus is particularly relevant, as existing research has shown that movement from the private to the public sector is a significant phenomenon. Our findings contribute to ongoing discussions surrounding private-to-public cooling-off periods and recusal policies, offering insights into how prior lobbying experience may shape interactions within public office.