Caretaker Cabinets: Institutional Evolution, Political Significance, and Constitutional Reform in Bulgaria

The institution of caretaker cabinets has emerged as a critical governance mechanism in both new and established democracies. Unlike “de-commissioned” or “cabinets in resignation,” newly formed caretaker cabinets—often referred to as administrative or business (“zakelijke,” “служебни”) cabinets—are designed to fulfil specific transitional tasks, most notably the organization of elections. While traditionally seen as non-partisan and technocratic stopgaps, recent developments in East-Central Europe (CEE), particularly in Bulgaria, have revealed a more politically complex and impactful role for these cabinets. This paper examines the evolution of the institution of caretaker cabinet in Bulgaria, their influence on governance, and the recent constitutional amendments aimed at curbing presidential authority in their appointment. Caretaker cabinets are a unique institutional phenomenon with significant implications for democratic governance. Traditionally, they are assumed to be non-partisan, serving as compromise mechanisms during political deadlocks. However, Hlousek and Kopecek (2014) argue that in CEE countries such as Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, caretaker cabinets are more politically engaged than their Western European counterparts. They often reflect the influence of political parties and institutions, playing a pivotal role in policy decisions during transitional periods. Bulgaria provides a compelling case study of this phenomenon. Caretaker cabinets are appointed by the President during early elections, bypassing the need for parliamentary approval. Initially tasked with overseeing electoral processes, these cabinets have increasingly exerted influence over policymaking. Early examples include the Sofiyanski and Bliznashki caretaker governments, which aligned closely with the President's political interests (Tsurakov, 2008). Since 2021, political fragmentation has deepened Bulgaria’s reliance on caretaker cabinets, with seven rounds of early elections resulting in more than half of the period being dominated by these interim bodies. This shift has transformed the caretaker cabinet from a temporary measure into a central feature of Bulgarian politics, amplifying the President's power and enabling significant policy decisions despite their limited mandate. The growing influence of caretaker cabinets has also ignited constitutional reform. In December 2023, amendments were enacted to limit the President’s authority in appointing caretaker Prime Ministers. The reform restricts eligible appointees to high-ranking state officials, such as the Chair of the National Assembly, the Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, and their deputies. This measure was explicitly aimed at reducing the power of President Rumen Radev, who had appointed four caretaker cabinets since 2021, often to further his own political agenda. Another amendment mandated that the National Assembly remain in session until a new parliament is elected, ensuring that executive power remains with politically accountable parties rather than the President. Using document analysis and a comparative approach, this paper will offer a comprehensive analysis of Bulgaria’s caretaker cabinets, highlighting their evolving role in governance and the implications of constitutional reforms. It will contribute to broader discussions on transitional governance, institutional design, and the challenges of political fragmentation in parliamentary democracies.