When Talking About the EU Backfires: the Effect of Economic Cueing by National Governments on Attachment to the EU

This study explores how economic framing by national governments, inscribed within domestic political dynamics, affect political support for the EU. Building on framing theory and citizens’ reliance on domestic cues due to limited EU information, the study focuses on governments as framing agents, as opposed to the focus on traditional actors in the literature such as parties or the media. A large-scale survey experiment conducted in April 2023 across 16 EU countries examined the effect of economic cueing by national governments, varying three dimensions: source (prime-minister vs. a neutral source), salience (high-salience ECB interest rate hikes vs. low-salience Recovery Fund), and valence (blame-attribution vs. reward-highlighting). On average, endorsement of a claim by the government has a negative effect on EU attachment in comparison to neutral sources, but only when the claim emphasizes economic benefits from a low-salience economic instrument (NGEU). Further investigation of heterogenous treatment effects shows that positive economic framing does not galvanize EU attachment among those distrusting national governments – instead, a positive message can actually erode EU attachment if endorsed by the government. This effect is stronger when salience is low, aligning with expectations that cueing serves as an heuristic for EU attitudes the more citizens are constrained by imperfect information. These findings highlight the moderating role of domestic politics in shaping perceptions of the EU, especially the extent to which domestic politics can limit governments’ EU cueing role, namely due to the negative effect of positive cueing among government opponents.