Can Czech Senators Advocate Constituency Interests Without the Formal Power to Do So?

The advocacy of territorial units' interests by upper chambers is a common pattern in federations and large and heterogeneous states. Such upper chambers then have specific powers and instruments to fulfil this role. At the same time, however, there are upper chambers that lack such powers, are not fragmented states, and yet, in which the interests of territorial units seem to be promoted. In our case study analysing Czech bicameralism, we examine (1) whether an upper chamber can effectively advocate for the interests of territories even in the case of a small, centralized, and homogeneous country, and (2) most importantly, how members of an upper chamber can do so when this role was not originally intended to be performed by given upper chamber and when the members of the chamber do not possess formal powers for such role. We conducted semi-structured interviews with Czech senators, which were then subjected to content analysis. We identified two different approaches to exercising the senatorial function – either focusing on national (or transnational) issues or advocating the constituency's interests (alternatively, a mix of both). Senators who seek to advocate for the interests of their constituencies primarily use their authority and influence when engaging with the government, ministries, and other authorities (often in informal processes). Senators, however, also use some formal powers not originally designed to promote the interests of constituencies/territories, such as amending implementing rules and other annexes of laws. Our study thus enriches the existing literature on bicameralism, which traditionally associated territorial units' representation with federations or heterogeneous, decentralized states.