Lobbying Regulations as an Information Tool for Policy-Makers: Evidence from France and Ireland

As lobbying regulations and their respective registers continue to proliferate rapidly, research has begun to explore the strategic function presented by these policies as a source of information for interest groups. However, little (if anything) is known about the demand side of the policy-making equation; that of the strategic potential of lobbying register data for policy-makers. Unlike interest groups who use this data to inform their advocacy strategies, policy-makers may instead utilise lobbying register data for other means such as gate keeping, interest group background checks, or ensuring ethical compliance of the groups they meet with, among others. As such, lobbying registers may be engaged with by actors on both sides of the policy-making equation in alternative ways for alternative means. Drawing on original cross-national survey data of Irish and French policy-maker’s interactions with national lobbying registers, this paper analyses how and why lobbying register data is consumed by policy-makers. As legislative environments characterised by different interest intermediation structures, this study will provide a nuanced analysis of the consumption habits among alternative policy-makers (elected and unelected) operating in alternative contexts. This paper contributes significantly to understanding the to-date under-explored impact of lobbying regulations on the demand side of the policy-making process, and how such regulatory policies manifest in practice. As some jurisdictions begin to amend their lobbying regulations, understanding the strategic utility of these policies becomes increasingly salient.