Polarization and Democracy in Central Europe

To better understand ideological polarization, it is crucial to comprehend mobilization dynamics for and against liberal democracy. In Central Europe, populists rose to power, causing democracy to decline, yet electoral and non-electoral participation increased, indicating a complex relationship between populism, polarization, and societal mobilization. This paper utilizes Bernhard's typology (2020), participant observation of 2022-2023 protests events and unique quasi-experimental data from the 2023 Czech presidential election to explore societal mobilization for and against liberal democracy in Central Europe. The paper is structured in three parts: the first builds a conceptual framework on the relationship between populism, (ideological and affective) polarization, and democratic erosion; the second investigates the drivers of mobilization, especially populist attitudes, and affective polarization, using unique pre- and post-election surveys; and the third explores two potential paths for Central European democracy based on findings from the Czech case and V-Dem data: democratic decay and democratic resilience. In the democratic decay scenario, polarization increases pro-autocratic mobilization, with an uncivil society forming mutually beneficial ties with ruling populist parties or establishing viable alternatives. Pro-liberal democracy civil society is suppressed, repressed, or co-opted by the ruling populists, fostering and instrumentalizing polarization. In the democratic resilience scenario, civil society mobilizes to safeguard liberal democracy, preventing further polarization and democratic decay.