When local governments win (and when they lose): Conditions for successful intergovernmental lobbying in Germany

When do federal governments listen to local governments? Although local government associations (LGAs) are among the most important lobbying actors in modern democracies, we still know very little about when and why LGAs can shape federal decision-making according to their preferences. Addressing this research gap, this article investigates the conditions for lobbying success of LGAs in the German Bundestag during the 19th legislative period (2017–2021). Applying the main explanatory factors for lobbying success from the literature on business and public interest groups to LGAs, the article argues that intergovernmental lobbying success can be explained by actor and issue-level characteristics. The research hypotheses are tested using a new dataset of 555 legislative requests from LGAs to 87 bills discussed in the public hearings of the Bundestag’s standing committees. Multilevel logistic regression analyses reveal that LGAs are more likely to attain their preferences if a) their legislative requests are to preserve the status quo, b) they engage in a lobbying coalition of LGAs that signals unity among local governments, c) they submit a larger amount of policy-related technical information and d) their legislative requests are supported by the Federal Council. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, bill complexity decreases the likelihood of success, while public saliency does not exert a significant effect. The findings have implications for the interest group literature and contribute to our understanding of territorial interest representation in federal architectures.