The gap in policy preference between the masses and parliamentary elites is observed around the globe, both in new and old democracies. Some gaps occur in highly salient policy areas and do not disappear in the short term. Lasting mass-elite policy preference discrepancy does not end as a less-than-ideal description of democracy but a phenomenon with real-world implications. It reduces people’s satisfaction with democracy, trust in government, and inclination to vote. The mass-elite gap is also related to the rise of populism as well as democratic backsliding in multiple-word regions.
Against this background, the paper deepens our understanding of mass-elite representation gaps through a global-level comparative historical analysis. Drawing from historical institutionalism, it focuses on four global cases where there is a noticeable mismatch between mass and elite policy preferences, specifically in religious issues (Tunisia and Indonesia) and foreign relations issues (Bulgaria and Japan). Firstly, utilizing multiple data sources such as surveys, legislative speeches, and voting records, the paper demonstrates the existence of a significant mass-elite gap in all four global cases during the 2010s. Secondly, in an effort to comprehend the cause of each mass-elite gap, this paper employs the process-tracing method to trace their historical origins.
The result drawn from all four cases covered in this paper shows that gaps were linked to deliberate action or inaction by parliamentary elites. When a historical window of opportunity presented itself, the elites (to serve their current interests) intentionally politicized or depoliticized specific issues against the demands of the general public. The emerged mass-elite gap during the critical juncture was not easy to close due to three self-reinforcing mechanisms—elites’ marginalization of opponents, self-selection, and socialization. As a result, the gap could undermine the quality of democratic representation for the generations to come.
The key contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it brings historical institutionalism into an explanatory toolkit of the present scholarship. With few exceptions, existing scholarship has not paid much attention to the historical origins of observed mass-elite gaps. In contrast, the paper applies comparative historical analysis and demonstrates how a country's historical context, cleavage structure, and elite agency interacted to cause a particular representation gap type. Second, the paper takes a global approach and examines underexplored regions. Existing literature draws evidence predominantly from developed Anglo-European democracies. In contrast, the paper explicitly takes a global perspective and draws its conclusions from the evidence found in North Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe.
