The politicization of technical knowledge in adapting the European Union’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy missions to a new security environment

As part of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union has since 2003 deployed civilian missions externally to conduct a range of security assistance tasks, including training, monitoring, advising, and executive functions. At the end of 2023, 13 such missions were operational with approximately 2200 staff. Already preceded by the "geopolitical Europe" initiative, the decaying security situation in the European neighbourhood culminated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both of these influences have driven the European External Action Service (EEAS) towards a more adaptive approach in deploying and conducting civilian missions. The service has also identified a need to produce more actionable political information to member states. To support this, the service has launched several change initiatives related to organisational learning and more widely to the collection, development, and utilization of information and knowledge in the guidance of civilian CSDP, as well in EU external action more broadly. Using primary sources and direct evidence, the paper maps out three examples of how the aim of producing political information and the drive for more specificity in organisational learning takes place between the EEAS and EU civilian CSDP missions. First, the focusing of the EEAS annual lessons process in conflict prevention and crisis response on pre-identified areas with specific learning needs. Second, the advancement of targeted learning in the form of after action reviews, increasingly conducted for high priority issues. Third, the development of specialized networks of staff between civilian CSDP missions, aimed at strengthening task-specific thematic knowledge, and formulating concise outputs. The three examples demonstrate an attempt to increase the political impact of knowledge that has previously fulfilled a more technical purpose, or even to turn technical instruments into political ones. The potential implications of this process include increased EEAS influence in the decision-making culture on civilian CSDP, the differentiation of learning on the instrument, and furthering politicization of civilian CSDP.