Positions of Central European countries towards the Russian aggression in Ukraine and their impact on the European Union’s Eastern policy

The aim of the paper is to provide a theoretical and comparative analysis of the positions of Central European countries (CCE: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) towards Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the implications for the formation of the EU’s Eastern policy. Their attitudes towards Russia and Ukraine differ according to their political and economic interests, and this differentiation is also evident after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. The Russian aggression in 2014 and the annexation of Crimea already revealed the differentiated positions of CEE. While Poland was in favour of a robust response, Slovakia took a pragmatic stance and the Czech Republic and Hungary were clearly pro-Russian. Poland had already been very active within the EU, trying to define a clear European path for some countries emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union. This approach was reflected in the Polish-Swedish initiative that led to the adoption of the Eastern Partnership in 2009 by the EU. At the same time, Poland warned against Russia’s neo-imperial policy, and the main bone of contention between Poland and some EU member states, especially Germany, was the growing energy dependence on Russia, reflected in the construction of the Nord Stream pipelines. The following specific issues will be examined: (1) The EU’s inconsistency in its policy towards Russia and Ukraine prior to the outbreak of war in 2022. (2) CCE’ positions on Russia’s neo-imperial policy and the war in Ukraine; (3) CCE involvement in shaping the EU’s Eastern policy and response to the war in Ukraine; (4) CCE’ preferences on Ukraine’s European future and the definition of policy towards Russia; (5) CCE’ views on the development of the EU’s strategic cooperation with NATO and the United States in the context of the war in Ukraine.