Delegated Powers in the European Union: Executive Rule-making as a Federalising Process?

The proposed paper assesses the contribution the federalisation of the European Union made by the conferral of delegated powers to the European Commission. Having established the key elements of the EU’s system of delegated powers - the gradual empowerment of the Commission to adopt implementing measures, the growth of a corresponding system of committees composed of member state representatives to control the use of these powers, successive reforms to enable greater transparency and a degree of democratic scrutiny over the system - the paper proceeds to evaluate these developments from the perspective of federalisation. This analysis involves a determination of the federalising effects of the system along three dimensions: first, the potential shift in the balance of power between member states and EU institutions; second, the impact on the equilibrium between intergovernmental and supranational institutions at the European level; and, third, the influence on the trade-off between considerations for efficiency and democratic legitimacy. The paper concludes by summarising the various ways in which executive rule-making contributes to the wider process of federalisation in the European Union and comparing these with the experience of delegated powers in other federal systems.