Overconstitutionalised policies and democratic procedures in flux: the case of Bulgaria

In April 2023 Bulgaria is going to have its fifth general election within two years: four elections have not led to the formation of stable government. In the same time the country is experiencing strong economic growth, record increases of the industrial output and exports, and budget deficits and public depth within the Maastricht criteria. All this happens in the context of the Ukrainian war, post-Covid and with the negative impact of rising global inflation. Despite the fact that the democratic politics in the country is in a state of flux - for instance, new parties (some of them with a populist bend) emerging and winning elections - Bulgaria still has good chances to join the eurozone in 2025. Thus, Bulgaria presents a good case study of the effects of constitutionalisation on democracy: European integration, the currency board pegging the Bulgarian lev to the euro are examples of constitutional-in-their-nature constraints that stabilise economic policy in times of turmoil. In the same time, however, they could encourage political experimentalism and opportunism, and irresponsible bahaviour by both politicians and the electorate. A quasi-constitutional set of constrainsts - like the anticorruption monitoring from EU bodies and the Magnitsky Act sanctions from the US - play a similar regulative and guiding role in Bulgarian politics: they simultaneously focus public attention on the problem of corruption and encourage voters to experiment with political players with dubious reputation from a corruption point of view. This apparent paradox is explained by the populist backlash against foreign intervention in domestic politics and the sense of security that voters have that the EU and the US will step in if there is a really serious problem. The paper aims to examine these and other effects of constitutionalisation and quasi-constitutionalisation on democracy.