Polarization and the Democratic System: Kinds, Reasons, and Sites

It is generally agreed that politics has become more polarized in many countries around the world and that this is detrimental to democracy. While considerable progress has been made in terms of measuring and explaining polarization, we lack a systematic normative analysis of the phenomenon. This paper argues that “polarization” cannot be seen as one phenomenon that should be evaluated in one way. Nor is the problem for democracy that polarization has become too severe and the solution to find its “right level.” Rather, political polarization raises a series of issues and challenges that must be assessed in a differentiated manner. First, we must distinguish between different degrees and different kinds of polarization. Sometimes the degree of polarization might be the most important variable, other times kind might be so. Second, from the perspective of normative theory, we must consider the reasons (not only the causes) people may have for polarizing. Are they good or bad reasons? Third, we should distinguish between the content of polarized opinions and the process of forming polarized opinions. Both content and process can be assessed from the democratic point of view, but they raise different types of concern. Finally, we must differentiate between different sites of polarization. It matters for the democratic assessment of polarization where it occurs – in civil society or legislatures, during campaigns or in governing. Rather than applying the same standards to all political arenas, we should beware that different arenas have different purposes and should be judged in relation to their different functions within the democratic system, The paper reconstructs four different kinds of polarization – ideological, affective, sorting, and group – and identifies their opposites in a manner that is helpful for democratic evaluation. Next, it suggests some democratic criteria that can serve as standards for the normative analysis of polarization. This is followed by a critical evaluation of the claim that the problem for democracy is severe polarization and the aim is to find the Goldilocks point of its right level. If the issue is not the degree of polarization, it is tempting to conclude that the problem is its kind. Based on the existing literature, it is especially tempting to suggest that the problem is affective polarization, while ideological polarization can be good for democracy. However, I argue that this conclusion is premature, and that affective polarization is not necessarily bad for democracy. The ensuing section discusses the issue of how polarized opinions are formed. The issue of whether people’s opinions are formed in a free and rational way is central in normative democratic theory but largely ignored in studies of political polarization. The penultimate section argues that whether or not and how polarization harms democracy depends on the site at which it occurs. Thus, I propose that we take an approach to the democratic assessment of polarization, which regards democracy as a complex system in which political work is divided between different arenas that each must be evaluated in relation to their function.