Chronic epistemic injustice: conceptualization, assessment, and deliberative cure

Epistemic injustice exists when knowledge relevant to collective decisions goes unheard or gets discounted in ways that serve established hierarchy, and therefore inflicts wrongs upon the individuals or groups so disadvantaged. In Miranda Fricker’s (2007) classic statement, there are two kinds. Testimonial epistemic injustice occurs when prejudice leads relatively powerful people to dismiss considerations (such as arguments or testimonies) based on the social characteristics (such as class, race, or gender) of those advancing the considerations. Hermeneutical epistemic injustice is when the “collective interpretive resources” do not exist to make sense of oppression. We present an additional kind which we call chronic epistemic injustice, which can persist when the voiced considerations of the disadvantaged do get heard, and when relevant collective interpretive resources do exist. We define chronic epistemic injustice as a systematic misalignment between an individual or group’s subjective dispositions and what the individual or group expresses as its wants. Here, subjective dispositions cover values and beliefs, which in turn can draw upon collective interpretive resources. We stress the collective character of interpretive resources, because (in keeping with epistemic arguments about democracy) different individuals may have access to different relevant bits of information, interpretation, and reasoning, which need combining. Wants for their part can be expressed in terms of preferences and can be revealed in behaviour such as voting. This kind of epistemic injustice is chronic because it can be demonstrated empirically to exist to a degree in every case we have examined. We believe it applies to many, most, or perhaps even all political issues most of the time, affecting many and perhaps most of the people engaging those issues. It is injustice because (as we will demonstrate empirically) individuals experience the misalignment to different degrees; and those who experience it most are, we find, likely to be disadvantaged on other dimensions. Finally we will show how chronic epistemic injustice can be overcome in deliberative settings, as well as through more demanding structural changes. Reference Fricker, Miranda. 2007. EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING. Oxford: Oxford University Press.