On the Epistocratic Challenge to Democracy: The Viceful Voter

In contemporary political theory, the idea of epistocracy has again arisen as a challenge to democracy. “Again” because it is, of course, not a novel idea, but rather an interpretation of ideas at least as old as Plato’s ideal of philosopher kings. The underpinning notion is the same: citizens are, in general, too ignorant, too irrational, and too indifferent to make political decisions. Some form of epistocracy – a “rule of the wise” – should replace democracy, to the benefit of all. Not only do individual “bad” voters impose (undue) risk on other citizens, they also act wrongly, per se, when voting badly. This paper examines this latter argument – that individual citizens act morally wrong when voting badly – with the help of virtue ethics. A virtue ethical approach has several advantages when one is to evaluate whether an individual bad voter acts wrongly, irrespective of whether she causes harm. (I have elsewhere established that an individual “bad” voter cannot be said to cause undue risk of harm; the prospect of her vote being “bad” and decisive is simply too small.) More specifically, this paper tests the following epistocratic argument: P1: You ought not be morally and epistemically viceful when acting P2: To vote badly, is to act morally and epistemically vicefully P3: At a certain point, morally and epistemically viceful acting ought to be counteracted P4: To restrict individual bad voters’ right to vote, is a way to counteract moral and epistemic vicefulness C1: At a certain point, morally and epistemically viceful voters’ voting rights ought be restricted The paper discusses which moral and epistemic virtues and vices are relevant in the context of the voting (section 1); what is meant by “viceful voting” and whether individual voters, in general, can be said to vote vicefully (section 2); and whether voters can act in ways that are so viceful that they justify a restriction of their voting rights (section 3). The paper concludes that although premises 1-3 seem to hold, premise 4 (and therefore the conclusion) is not valid. To restrict individual’s voting rights is not a successful method to counteract viceful voting; rather, it can plausibly lead to less virtuous behavior. Instead of suggesting a restriction of voting rights on virtue ethical grounds, epistocrats would do better in better in proposing ways to enhance moral and epistemic virtues. These findings provide new insight into the debate between epistocrats and democrats, and provides a piece to the puzzle of which political system is most normatively attractive.