A technocratic or responsive European Commission? Informational lobbying and agenda-setting influence under quiet and noisy EU politics

Abstract. This paper analyzes the circumstances under which interest groups’ type of information supply to European Commission (EC) officials affects their chances of wielding agenda-setting influence. We argue that groups that provide information on the level of support are more likely to shape EC policy priorities than groups that prioritize expert information supply. We furthermore expect that this beneficial effect is contingent on the degree of public salience, polarization, and stakeholder mobilization. A novel dataset on the policy views of 138 interest groups concerning 47 policy issues related to the European Green Deal initiatives allows us to evaluate this argument. The results suggest that information on the level of support trumps the provision of expert information for achieving agenda-setting influence. Moreover, our empirical findings demonstrate that the marginal pay-off of supplying information on the level of support increases the more stakeholders mobilize on a policy issue.