The World Bank went from being skittish about the very mention of the word corruption until the early 1990s to later being widely considered primus inter pares among international organizations in addressing corruption, both in a theoretical and practical manner. This paper explores the evolution of the World Bank’s anti-corruption agenda and examines its driving and limiting factors. The analysis builds on a novel dataset of World Bank anti-corruption activities spanning the years 1996-2016. First, the impact of exogenous factors on the allocation of World Bank anti-corruption activities is tested using cross-country panel data. Second, endogenous factors affecting the World Bank’s anti-corruption agenda are examined qualitatively by way of distinguishing between three agendas that have been operating under the anti-corruption label. Those agendas, that have been at times complementary and at times competing, differ in their conceptual understanding of corruption as “a crime”, “a matter of public administration”, and “a matter of power and politics”. The analysis suggests that factors endogenous to the World Bank, i.e., individual leadership, career incentives, and lending pressure, are among the most significant in explaining the evolution of the Bank’s anti-corruption agenda. Addressing those factors will be crucial for any attempt at effectively renewing the World Bank’s strategic and operational approach to doing anti-corruption.
