National Policy Alternatives Under the European Economic Governance

While EU-Politicization is extensively studied within the media and in electoral campaigns, less is known about how governments and parliaments address the constraints that European rules bring to their national policy-competences. Considering that competition between government and opposition essentially consists in a competition over policy-alternatives, how does this competition change when the range of alternatives is defined by European rules? In other words: Are European constraints killing the debate between government and opposition at the national level, or do they still leave considerable choice between different policy alternatives? This paper addresses this question by investigating how the under the new framework of European economic governance, national governments debate their yearly budgets with the parliamentary opposition. Through a comparative content analysis of the budgetary debates held in parliament between finance ministers and opposition leaders, the paper investigates both the policy alternatives being discussed, as well as the arguments with which policy-decisions are being supported. Thereby, the paper tests the proposition that under the European economic rules, there are no alternatives to a restrictive policy course, and that increases in government expenditure are only possible when these are supported with clear and concrete arguments about how such increases are conform to the European budgetary commitments. The analysis focuses on both Northern and Southern European countries, and thus provides comparative insights about whether the European budgetary rules are more or less constraining for some countries rather than others.