Institutional Reform and Judicial Behaviour in the European Court of Human Rights

Do reappointment opportunities affect judges’ impartiality? On the one hand, non-renewable terms are commonly expected to decrease the influence of career considerations on judicial decision-making. On the other hand, political actors wishing to sanction the behavior of individual judges may well find other opportunities than reappointment do so. For instance, loyal judges may rewarded with appointment to other prestigious offices. It is, moreover, unclear if judges of high repute and with well-defined judicial philosophies would allow reappointment prospects to influence their decision-making. I exploit the 2010 introduction of non-renewable terms for European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judges to estimate the causal effect of reappointment opportunities on judicial impartiality. The ECtHR bench is composed of one judge nominated by each respondent state. Prior to the 2010 reform, judges wishing to secure reappointment therefore had incentives to side with their nominating state. I investigate whether judges became less prone to side with their nominating state after their terms became non-renewable. Preliminary results provide strong evidence for such an effect. Judges serving on the Court at the time of the reform became significantly less likely to side with their nominating state after it became clear that they would not be eligible for reappointment. These results show that career considerations influence the decision-making of judges at the international bench. They also show that institutional reforms can be successful in promoting judicial impartiality.