There are two main kinds of votes of no-confidence. The constructive vote of no-confidence (CVNV) differs from a regular vote of no-confidence (RVNC) by adding to the need for an absolute majority a condition of agreement on an alternative government, rendering the overthrow of a government more difficult. Together these two conditions make the CVNC conducive to government stability. Based on our preliminary research and initial findings, this proposed paper will examine the effect of the CVNC on government stability assessing if its intended goal – a positive effect on stability – can be empirically substantiated.
The paper will argue that the CVNC was designed to help strengthen the government, at the legislature's expense. We should, therefore, find more governments that have completed their terms of office in countries with the CVNC than in countries with a RVNC. We should also see more stability among those parties that make up the government in the countries with a CVNC, and more changes in governing parties during their tenure in the countries with a RVNC.
The proposed paper will present a theoretical background of parliaments and government termination by focusing on the connection between the CVNC and both government durability and stability. This will be followed by an explanation of our hypotheses, methods and cases studies, and an analysis of our findings concerning the argument that governments in political systems with a CVNC will be more stable. We conclude by pointing out that government stability is not equal to efficiency – governments can stay stable without necessarily being effective.
