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In an attempt to begin to fill the academic lacuna on no-confidence votes, this proposed workshop seeks papers that will trace the historical origins of the vote of no-confidence; delineate its development and expansion; elaborate an academic framework for analysis of votes of no-confidence; study its impact on, and consequences for, the way parliaments and governments operate; and assess their political consequences both theoretically and empirically. Parliamentary democracy, unlike the separation of powers in presidentialism, is a system where “executive authority emerges from, and is responsible to, the legislative authority” (Lijphart 1984:68; Cheibub 2007). In other words, as Sartori (1997:101) stated, parliamentarism requires “government to be appointed, supported and, as the case may be, dismissed, by parliamentary vote.” Still, we typically define parliamentary democracies by the rules prescribed for how their governments terminate rather than form. The core feature of parliamentarism is legislative confidence. That is, government has to be at least tolerated by the legislature (Bergman et al. 2003; Cheibub et al. 2016). No government can survive against the will of parliament. The instrument by which parliament can express its lack of support, is the vote of no-confidence. The vote of confidence is thus the institutional mechanism by which parliamentary democracy is fulfilled. In addition, most parliamentary systems practice the vote of confidence, initiated by the government (Huber 1996). In established parliamentary democracies, no-confidence votes are rare, and among these, those that pass are extremely rare. According to one study, only around 5 percent of no-confidence motions in advanced parliamentary democracies result in the termination of governments, indicating that most no-confidence motions are not intended for adoption (Williams 2011). These motions are a forceful way to publicize the government’s failings, and may represent an opportunity for opposition parties to signal policy priorities and to gain votes in the next election. Therefore, parliamentary systems primarily operate on the potential of, and anticipation for, a vote of no-confidence. This means two things: First, that the specific mechanism that exists in each parliament for the removal of the government will influence executive-legislative relations during the tenure of the government. Second, changing the rules concerning the vote of no-confidence will change the dynamics between the two branches. Comparative studies of parliamentarism have devoted some attention to the details of the institutions that regulate the relationship between the executive and the legislative powers, especially with respect to government formation, but this is far from being a central concern (e.g. de Winter 1995; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Strøm et al. 2003; Rasch et al. 2015). There are two main types of no-confidence votes: those that deal with no-confidence only, and those combining no-confidence and the formation of the next government in the same operation (Hazan 2014). Many parliamentary democracies use a regular no-confidence vote – requiring a simple majority in order to topple the government – and this is where practically all of the academic research has been focused. A handful of parliamentary democracies use the constructive vote of no-confidence – requiring the support of an absolute majority and an agreement on an alternative candidate to lead the government – possibly creating a situation where an absolute majority of the legislature opposes the government but cannot agree on a candidate to form an alternative government, and thus the government remains in power with all the repercussions for executive-legislative relations. There are intermediate variants, such as a regular vote of no-confidence requiring an absolute majority. No-confidence mechanism in general have had little conceptual or empirical research devoted to them, with hardly any focusing on the constructive variant. The study of no-confidence votes is both relevant and timely because one of the main trends that can be identified in the institutional evolution of parliamentary democracies is toward protecting the executive branch from fleeting majorities, or toward making it procedurally costlier to oppose the government (Cheibub et al. 2015). This can be seen in the adoption of restrictions to initiate a vote of no-confidence, such as requiring that a certain number of MPs initiate the proposal (for instance Sweden, where at least ten percent of parliamentarians must back the proposal) or restrictions on when proposals can be made (as in Greece, where at least six months must pass between floor votes on no-confidence proposals). Institutional measures to protect governments can also be seen in the larger majorities necessary to approve a no-confidence vote (the move from simple to absolute majorities in, for example, France, Greece and Portugal), and in the adoption of the constructive vote of no-confidence (originally a German invention to avoid the abuses of Weimar, but now in several countries including most recently Belgium and Israel). In general, no confidence procedures are far less ambiguous today than earlier, especially in the constitutions made after WWII. Apparently, increased fragmentation and instability in democratic parliamentary political systems has found its institutional panacea – one that is easier to adopt than electoral or political reform. Whether or not restricting the mechanism that defines parliamentary democracy is indeed a legislative tool to strengthen executive performance and durability has not received significant scholarly attention, our knowledge on this topic is uneven and beckons for systematic academic attention. The literature on parliamentary governments is vast and growing. It deals with the emergence of this system of government (Congleton 2011; Cox 2016; Cheibub et al. 2014), the characteristics of coalitions (Dodd 1976), the formation of minority (Strøm 1990) minimum winning (Riker 1962) and oversized coalitions (Volden and Carrubba 2004), the allocation of portfolios (Carroll and Cox 2007), the duration and durability of cabinets and ministers (Warwick 2007; Saalfeld 2008), and the political and economic consequences of governments (Persson and Tabellini 2005; Martin and Vanberg 2011). In recent years, more attention has been paid to institutional details of formation processes and how governments operate (Bergman 1993; Strøm et al. 1994; Diermeier et al. 2003; Rasch et al. 2015). The same is not true for questions related to how and why governments end. Our understanding of the use of dissolution power certainly has improved (Smith 2004), and some recent studies demonstrate the tremendous complexity of constitutional rules regulating early elections (Strøm and Swindle 2002; Goplerud and Schleiter 2016). We do not yet find a similar push to understand the core feature of parliamentary systems, that is to say the confidence relationship. In a set of papers Williams (2011, 2016) investigates why parties propose no-confidence motions and – even if they almost always are rejected – how they impact the electoral fortunes of government and opposition parties. Our aim, however, is to focus on the details and complexities of the rules regulating no-confidence procedures, as well as their evolution and the indirect and direct effects of variation in procedural rules. As Damgaard (2010:301) correctly argued, “If government formation is crucial in parliamentary democracies… then the termination of the very same cabinets must be equally important… On the whole, therefore, formation and termination of cabinets delineate political processes that we cannot and should not study in mutual isolation.” Until now, these two have been assessed quite separately, and a change in the latter has not been theorized to have an influence on the former. This proposed workshop argues the contrary. Focusing on the vote of no-confidence we seek to connect the type of no-confidence vote and the formation, management and duration of government coalitions in parliamentary democracies (Hazan 2014; Sieberer 2015); we posit that different types of no-confidence mechanisms will produce different kinds of governments and different dynamics in executive-legislative relations. In conclusion, while the literature on parliamentary coalitions is vast, the lack of analyses of the confidence relationship itself is a striking weakness, as is the attempt to connect between these two. References Bergman, T. 1993. “Formation Rules and Minority Governments”, European Journal of Political Research 23: 55-66. Bergman, T., W. Müller, K. Strøm and M. Blomgren. 2003. “Democratic Delegation and Accountability: Cross-national Patterns”, in K. Strøm, W. Müller and T. Bergman, eds. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carroll, R. and G. Cox 2007. “The Logic of Gamson’s Law: Pre-election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations”, American Journal of Political Science 51: 300-313. Cheibub, J.A. 2007. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cheibub, J.A., Z. Elkins and T. Ginsburg. 2014. “Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism”, British Journal of Political Science 44: 515-544. Cheibub, J.A., S. Martin and B.E. Rasch. 2015. “Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies”, West European Politics 38: 969-996. Cheibub, J.A., S. Martin and B.E. Rasch. 2016. “Constitutional Parliamentarism: Executive-Legislative Relations in Early and Contemporary Parliamentary Regimes”. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, United States. Cox, G.W. 2016. Marketing Sovereign Promises: Monopoly Brokerage and the Growth of the English State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Congleton, R. 2011. Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Reform, Liberalism, and the Rise of Western Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Damgaard, E. 2010. “Cabinet Termination,” in K. Strøm, W.C. Müller and T. Bergman, eds. Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Winter, L. 1995. “The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation,” in H. Döring, ed. Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Diermeier, D., H. Erasian and A. Merlo. 2003. “A Structural Model of Government Formation”, Econometrica 71: 27-70. Dodd, L. 1976. Coalitions in Parliamentary Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Goplerud, M. and P. Schleiter. 2016. “An Index of Assembly Dissolution Powers”, Comparative Political Studies 49: 427-456. Hazan, R.Y. 2014. “The Constructive Vote of No-Confidence: An Analytical Framework and Legislative Consequences”. Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, Glasgow, Scotland. Huber, J.D. 1996. “The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Political Science Review 90(2): 269-282. Laver, M. and K.A. Shepsle. 1996. Making and Breaking Governments. Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lijphart, A. 1984. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press. Martin, L.W. and G. Vanberg. 2011. Parliament and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Persson, T. and G.E. Tabellini. 2005. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Riker, W. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press. Rasch, B.E., S. Martin and J.A. Cheibub, eds. 2015. Parliaments and Government Formation: Unpacking Investiture Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Saalfeld, T. 2008. “Institutions, Chance and Choices: The Dynamics of Cabinet Survival in the Parliamentary Democracies of Western Europe (1945-99)”, in W. Müller, K. Strøm and T. Bergman, eds. Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sartori, G. 1997. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd ed., New York: New York University Press. Sieberer, U. 2015. “Hire or Fire? The Link between Investiture and Removal in Parliamentary Democracies,” in B.E. Rasch, S. Martin and J.A. Cheibub, eds. Parliaments and Government Formation: Unpacking Investiture Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, A. 2004. Election Timing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strøm, K. 1990. Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strom, K., I. Budge and M. Laver 1994. “Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies”, American Journal of Political Science 38: 303-335. Strøm, K. and S. Swindle 2002. “Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution”, American Political Science Review 96: 575-91. Strøm, K., W. Müller and T. Bergman, eds. 2003. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volden, C. and C.J. Carrubba 2004. “The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies”, American Journal of Political Science 48: 521-537. Warwick, P. 2007. Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, L.K. 2011. “Unsuccessful Success? Failed No-Confidence Motions, Competence Signals, and Electoral Support”, Comparative Political Studies 44: 1474-1499. Williams, L.K. 2016. “Opposition Parties and the Timing of Successful No-Confidence Motions”, Political Science Research and Methods 4: 533-553.
In an attempt to begin to fill the academic lacuna on no-confidence votes, this proposed workshop seeks papers that will trace the historical origins of the vote of no-confidence; delineate its development and expansion; elaborate an academic framework for analysis of votes of no-confidence; study its impact on, and consequences for, the way parliaments and governments operate; and assess their political consequences both theoretically and empirically. While we are interested in comparative analyses in particular, we are also looking for case studies and theoretical papers that improve our understanding of the relationships between no-confidence mechanisms and both government formation and executive-legislative relations. The proposed workshop is also interested in papers on votes of confidence that take place during the tenure of a government, and their impact on executive-legislative relations in general and on the vote of no-confidence in particular. We encourage researchers at the early stages of their career, female legislative scholars and PhD students to apply.
Title | Details |
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The Inflated Measures of Governmental Instability | View Paper Details |
The Vote of Confidence Procedure in Parliamentary Democracies | View Paper Details |
The Vote of No-Confidence: Towards an Analytical Framework for Analysing Parliaments and Government Termination | View Paper Details |
Government Termination and Government Stability | View Paper Details |
Government-Opposition Dynamics and the Vote of No-Confidence | View Paper Details |
No-Confidence Procedures in Semi-Parliamentary Systems | View Paper Details |
Party Switching and Government Termination in Israel and India | View Paper Details |
Sitting Back or Fighting to Survive? How Governments React to No-Confidence Votes | View Paper Details |
The Determinants of Cabinet Stability in the German Federal States, 1945–2018 | View Paper Details |
Party System Polarisation, Anti-System Parties and Legislative Institutions as Predictors of Cabinet Survival in 28 Parliamentary Democracies, 1945–2013 | View Paper Details |