Retrenchment of Unemployment Protection and the Absence of Public Resistance. How Deservingness Assessments Attenuate Interest Assessment in Opinion Formation

In the past few decades, unemployment protection has been made considerably less generous in terms of social rights and more conditional in terms of work-related obligations in most European welfare states (Clasen, Kvist, & van Oorschot, 2001). With the aim of ‘activating’ the unemployed, eligibility rules were tightened, benefit levels declined or stagnated, entitlement periods shortened, and demands on geographical, occupational and wage mobility toughened. However, in most European countries, such retrenchment rarely met fierce public resistance. From Pierson’s (1994, 1996) perspective, the absence of large-scale mobilization against retrenchment of unemployment benefits is rather surprising, as in Europe these programs serve relatively large and well-organized welfare constituencies whose political power should enable them to defend their beloved programs against governmental cutbacks. After all, for decades, unemployment benefits have delivered economic security to large parts of the European workforce, whose interests have traditionally been promoted by specialized labour unions. This article seeks to explain the puzzle of why unemployment protection schemes were so easily retrenched in most European countries, despite having politically powerful welfare constituencies. Building on Schneider & Ingram’s social construction theory (1993), we argue that cutbacks in unemployment protection were implemented without much public opposition because the working-age unemployed are, compared with other policy target groups such the old and the sick, burdened with a rather negative public image that renders them less deserving of welfare support in the public’s eye (van Oorschot, 2006). Using unique but hitherto underused data from the 2006 Dutch and 2008 Danish Welfare Opinions Survey, this article examines how such popular deservingness perceptions compare to self-interest considerations, implied in the Pierson-argument, in terms of explaining public support for the social rights and obligations of the unemployed. Our analyses suggest that deservingness perceptions outperform self-interest assessments in terms of explanatory power, and, in doing so, seem to attenuate the relationship between self-interest and attitude formation. Those who hold rather negative deservingness beliefs are markedly less generous and more conditional towards the unemployed, net of their perceived self-interest in unemployment provision, social-structural characteristics, and political ideology. References: Clasen, J., Kvist, J., & van Oorschot, W. (2001). On condition of work: Increasing work requirements in unemployment compensation schemes. In M. Kautto, J. Fritzell, B. Hvinden, J. Kvist, & H. Uusitalo (Eds.), Nordic welfare states in the European context (pp. 198–231). London: Routledge. Pierson, P. (1994). Dismantling the welfare state. Reagan, Thatcher, and the politics of retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pierson, P. (1996). The New Politics of the Welfare State. World Politics, 48(2), 143–179. Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social construction of target populations: implications for politics and policy. American Political Science Review, 87(2), 334–347. van Oorschot, W. (2006). Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states. Journal of European Social Policy, 16(1), 23–42.