A broad stream of the literature on populism has analysed populist mobilization as the reflection of social conflicts and the expression of social demands for the inclusion of disadvantaged social groups or exclusion of social groups (such as migrants) whilst ‘charismatic leadership should not be considered a defining attribute’ of populism (Kaltwasser and Taggert 2013: 361). This contribution will follow Kurt Weyland’s seminal definition of populism as ‘a personalistic way of competing for and exercising political power’ (Weyland 2001: 11). It will argue that in populist governments personalization and de-institutionalization are intrinsically linked. De-institutionalization is justified by the struggle against an ‘oppressive elite’ (cf. Levitsky and Way 2010) and the rejection of the constraints institutions impose on majoritarian democracy (cf. Meny and Surel 2001).
This contribution will highlight the common characteristics of the governments of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, Victor Orban in Hungary and R.T. Erdogan in Turkey using the method of agreement in the comparison of an established, semi-established and an emerging democracy. It will demonstrate that populism in government has led to different degrees of personalization and de-institutionalization of politics in three areas: political parties, mass media and state relations to economic actors. Parties are de-institutionalized and subjected to individual “leadership”, the autonomy of media is infringed by personal intervention in state-controlled media or close relations between the populist leader and media owners (which in the case of Berlusconi have been identical). State contracts are subjected to personal relationships between the populist leader and business groups.
Personalization and de-institutionalization can vary in the personalization of political organizations, illiberal media politics and neopatrimonial economic policies. Whereas Berlusconi’s Casa delle libertà was arguably the least institutionalized party (in terms of formal decision-making rules), in Italy personalistic interventions in mass media and the economy remained more circumscribed during the Berlusconi governments.