Clientelism in Macedonia and its effects on the Country’s Accession Process in the EU

Despite EU efforts to improve control of corruption during the accession process of the Western Balkans, various forms of state capture remain a serious problem in the region. This paper draws on the theoretical insights of Mungiu-Pippidi and Grzymala-Busse to examine the nature of state capture in Macedonia. It illustrates the presence of cluentelism, a specific form of state capture, in the country. It also examines the different subcategories of clientelism that are present in Macedonia, especially patronage and vote buying, and argues that these problems have seriously undermined the rule of law in the country. As rule of law and control of corruption are among the main criteria for EU accession, by using Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s external incentives model the paper also analyses the consequences of clientelism on Macedonia’s accession process in the EU. First, the specific domestic factors that characterize the nature of state capture in Macedonia are identified. These include: diminished separation between the state and the ruling party, characterized by strong party loyalty, politicization of all three divisions of power and serious problems with the operability and capacity of relevant institutions to enforce rule of law; and absence of political and economic independence of media actors and weak civil society sector, which (fail to) affect citizens’ perceptions and attitudes towards corruption. Consequently, it is argued that patronage and vote buying are present in Macedonia, due to monopoly in power distribution, state ownership by few political elites, unfair and predictable distribution of public goods, and no distinction between the public and private. Second, the paper examines the consequences of this particular form of state capture on the EU accession process of Macedonia. In a clientelistic environment, ruling elites have little interest to maintain the rule of law, which in turn directly affects the conditionality mechanism of the EU. In such a setting the costs of joining the EU and enforcing the rule of law are too high for domestic rent-seeking elites, which benefit from maintaining the status quo and sustaining their power and control over state institutions. The paper employs documentary analysis and elite interviews with national and European experts on corruption and enlargement.