Clientelism and the Rule of Law (RoL) in New Democracies

Abstract

Clientelism is a widespread phenomenon, in both new and old democracies. Nevertheless, in many of the new democratic settings, informal norms have had a longer time to consolidate and become normative guidelines of social interaction. Empirical studies abound in areas such as CEE, SEE, or Latin America showing the complexity of clientelistic systems of informal resource distribution. The consolidation of such informal linkages and norms of conduct often creates a tension with contemporary formal rules and regulations (i.e. Rule of Law), as well as institutional processes. As political parties no longer survive based on strong roots in society we see a rising prominence of political cartelization and state capture in order to extract transactional resources. Consequently, the principal-agent relationship between the electorate and the politicians is often distorted, and mediated by informal brokers. This panel seeks to address the question of what are the effects political clientelism and the Rule of Law can have on each other? Focusing on CEE and the Balkans, the papers included in this panel draw on internal or contextual institutional weaknesses such as party patronage or state capture, as well as on the normative effects of external pressures to uphold the Rule of Law.