Article 7 has been labelled “the nuclear option” implying that its destructive power is so big that it makes unthinkable to activate it. In normative terms, this conception implicitly accepts that the EU should co-exist or accommodate an errant member state that defies its own values rather than facing a confrontation with it. This paper will dispute this conception. Using the same analogy of nuclear arms, it would suggest that the strongest mechanisms for forcing a revision of errant behavior is precisely EU´s preparedness to activate its sanctioning mechanisms. The paper will revise the institutional design of the provision looking at the role of the EU institutions and, particularly in the stages of triggering and decision-making of the procedure. Commission´s shyness to activate the procedure and unanimity in the European Council will be singled out as the main weaknesses. Alternative mechanisms, such as permanent vis-à-vis incidental scrutiny systems will be also discussed.
