Who should Enforce Democracy? Debating Supranational Enforcement of Liberal Democracy at the National Level

Abstract

‘What authority do supranational or international bodies have to prevent a member state from going to hell, if a majority in a member state wishes to do so?’ Jan-Werner Müller poses this provocative question at the end of his annual review on normative perspectives on militant democracy (2016: 263). Militant democracy is a normative model in which liberal democracies are allowed to act in illiberal ways against citizens that set out to undermine the democratic system itself. A limitation of political rights is the most traditional way to prevent such abuse. Another example is the transfer of decision-making power to non-elected bodies, such as the constitutional courts. Constraints to popular government are not limited to national bodies. International human rights courts constitute non-majoritarian bodies that limit national democratic self-governance. The European Union (EU) is a constitutive part of a militant democratic order constructed in Europe after the Second World War (Müller 2012). In this panel, we aim to bring together normative political theory with empirical social science to address the concept of militant democracy. The term militant democracy was famously coined by Karl Lowestein. He explicitly addresses the rise of fascism that continued to preoccupy scholars. The recent rise of rightwing populism contributes to a renewed interest being taken in this topic. The normative literature offers basic justifications for militant democracy. One line of argument is that one may or even should ‘fight fire with fire’. For instance, developing countries require more robust means to prevent a collapse back into authoritarianism. A second prominent justification is a pedagogical one. The justification is that anti-democratic and anti-liberal sentiments erode the cultural stability required for democracy. In short, the harmful effects of their actions on the rest of society justify intervention (Müller 2016). These justifications raise two sets of questions. Firstly, the criteria when implementation of militant democracy measures, such as bans, is acceptable. Or maybe more precisely, when certain means are proportionate to the ends. Secondly, and related, the question of authority arises from these justifications; who can restrict citizens’ rights: judges, technocrats, or elected democratic politicians? The latter two sets of normative questions are closely related to the empirical context. If the answer should have any relevance to the real world problem it purports to address, the answer should take into account real-world constraints, such as effectiveness and feasibility. The panel seeks to advance the literature on militant democracy toward the international dimension. With a few notable exceptions mainly focusing on the EU (Bogandy et al 2012, De Witte 2013, Müller 2012-2013, 2013, 2015,), most recent contributions focus on militant democracy in the nation-state (e.g. Capoccia 2013, Muller 2012, Thiel 2009). Philosophical contributions similarly tend to assume in their justifications a basic structure of enforcement - in other words the state. Relatively little work has yet been done on the (potential) international dimension of militant democracy (Müller 2016: 263). This workshop sets out to correct this gap in the literature.