The paper analyses the development of clientelistic practices which emerged as a side effect of a reformist initiative dealing with the implementation of elderly policy in Croatia. Reform of the arrangements for the delivery of the elderly care services, previously provided by state or market actors, was launched in the mid-2000s with a goal of fostering better connection, reciprocity and solidarity between generations. For the attainment of that goal government relied on management reform model that promoted more horizontal types of steering and the engagement of a citizens and local communities in the production of public services they personally receive.
Even though service reform was originally promoting inclusion, analysis revealed that realization of reformist goals was followed by rather politicized design of structure and biased selection of actors participating in the implementation network. Moreover, political executive that proved to be inclined to engage in politicization or rent-seeking activities misused their metagovering role and the reform process as a route to turn interactive service provision into opportunities for the employment of local party members or supporters as service providers.
While employing process tracing method, the paper uses the notion of political metagovernance as a conceptual starting point and examines causal mechanism that can account for such reform outcome. Using evidence gathered from interviews with policy actors, official documents and statistical data, paper reveals how did clientelistic government inspired by network-based forms of governance failed to move the traditional service provision into genuine co-production but has, instead, overly politicized the role of metagovernors for the integration of partisan patronage practices into service delivery.
