ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Dispute Dynamics and Japanese Public Approval for Coercive Measures during the Senkaku Dispute: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

Conflict
Quantitative
Decision Making
Domestic Politics
Experimental Design
Graeme Davies
University of Leeds
Graeme Davies
University of Leeds

Abstract

Previous studies of territorial disputes have shown that they are more likely than other types of dispute to escalate into an international war (Tir and Vasquez 2010; Hensel 2012; Diehl 2013). Despite developing a good understanding of the macro factors that influence territorial disputes and war onset there are still significant gaps in our understanding. In a recent article Wright and Diehl (2014) highlighted that we have little knowledge of how domestic politics drive territorial disputes to war. While their study did an excellent job of unpacking some of the causal mechanisms that drive territorial disputes to war they were unable to provide direct evidence of how public opinion influences the “Steps to War” (Wright and Diehl 2014). Our study addresses this gap by using an experiment about a real world territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/ Diayou Islands . Using a multi-stage experimental design we are able to investigate how dispute dynamics influence Japanese public opinion potentially incentivising their government to make certain foreign policy choices and constraining them from others. This analysis makes several contributions to our understanding of how public opinion in democratic states can potentially escalate territorial disputes to international war. Firstly, it provides one of the few micro-foundational investigations of the Steps to War theory (Senese and Vasquez 2008), applying insights from both audience cost and diversionary war literatures. Secondly, the analysis will explain how target state behaviour can affect public opinion and potentially provide incentives for elites to behave more hawkishly towards their opponents. Finally, the analysis provides us with a good understanding of the Japanese public opinion landscape that a Japanese Prime Minister (PM) will have to negotiate when confronting China over the Islands.