To coopt is to use apparently cooperative practices to absorb contenders - to make them work with you without giving them any new advantages. In this scenario the contenders can no longer maintain the appearance of credible and independent actors and therefore lose their legitimacy and become politically irrelevant. A central assumption in social movement theorists’ treatment of the problem of cooptation is that it is typically the desired, albeit not always feasible, outcome for elites confronted by contestation, preferable to either suppression or concession. In this paper we scrutinize the rationale of this strategy and discuss whether cooptation is always a rational Plan A. We find one scenario in which elites should instead reasonably aim for mutually assured autonomy. The prospect to gain legitimacy through an external source makes it rational to act to preserve a mode of cooperation that respects each actor’s independence. This scenario, we argue, occurs frequently in contentious action. We demonstrate its relevance theoretically and empirically with examples from interactions between social movements and state institutions and discuss movements’ strategies in this mutual autonomy scenario.
