We investigate the role of gender in the choice of whether or not to run for polit-
ical office. In order to control for confounding factors that might affect the relative
propensities for women and men to enter politics, we take the question of the choice to
enter elections to the laboratory. The key features of our experimental design involve
(1) an objective task that represents policymaking ability for which there is population
heterogeneity, (2) monetary rewards that ensure that all subjects, regardless of gender,
face the same incentives (conditional only on their own task ability) to run for office
and to select a representative with the highest task ability, and (3) a comparison of
random versus electoral selection mechanisms. Formal analysis of the incentives in our
experiment clarifies the role of task ability and identifies several additional factors in
the decision to enter the election. Preliminary evidence indicates that there are gender
differences in choices to run for office, with women less likely to run than men with
similar abilities, and that such differences are specific to the competitive and strategic
context of campaigns and elections.
