Elite Conflicts and Regime Trajectories

Abstract

No (would-be) dictator, however powerful or charismatic, can undermine democracy or entrench authoritarian rule alone. They need powerful elites who help enforce decisions and command citizen support. Yet, we know little about who these elites are and how their decisions can bolster or subvert authoritarianism. This panel welcomes papers with novel data, theory, and methodologies to approach the study of elites during democratization/autocratization processes around three questions: (1) What type of executive leaders' elite coalition shapes autocratization processes (e.g., success, speed, depth, and order)? (2) Can elite conflicts (e.g., defections to the opposition) within the government subvert authoritarianism (e.g., stop autocratization processes or improve democratization prospects in dictatorships)? (3) Do regime types affect elites' strategies to subvert authoritarianism?

Title	Details
Elite Rivalry, Coalitions, and Violent Disruption in Authoritarian Regimes	View Paper Details
The Informational Theory of Leadership Cults: Evidence from the Soviet Party Congresses and Plenums, 1924-39	View Paper Details
Endorsing Takeover: Elite Support for Regime Personalization in Turkey	View Paper Details
A New Dataset for the Study of Political Elites in Electoral Autocracies	View Paper Details
Elite Defection Under Polarization	View Paper Details