This paper uses a meta-analysis approach to detect emerging patterns with regards to the use and (potential) effectiveness of political conditionalities since 2000, with a particular emphasis on the period after 2005 (Paris Declaration). The patterns detected, and particularly the enabling and constraining factors are compared with the existing insights on political conditionalities. Existing insights on political conditionalities (in Low Income Countries, LICs) mainly date from the pré-2000 and some of the insights and lessons learned with regards to the effective use of conditionalities needs to be revised and updated. Our research shows that particularly the concept of credibility and the argument of fungibility need to be adapted due to the changed nature of aid provision. The introduction of budget support has profoundly changed the incentive structure of both donors and recipients. At the level of donors increased leverage but also increased accountability pressures have stimulated the use of political conditionalities and increased the probability of ‘credible sanctions’. Donors may not have become more credible actors, but sanctions have become more credible given the large number of suspension cases. At the level of recipients, the suspension of budget support is perceived to be more damaging than the withdrawl of project aid since the latter does not affect the public sector as a whole. Taken together this heavily pressures recipient government to ‘give in’ to political conditionalities. Our research also shows that the presence of China does not have pre-determined effects on the likelihood that donors will refrain from using political conditionalities. In some cases, it seems, the ‘threat’ of China has actually glued donors together into one block, and added to that, the presence of China is of little importance to donor constituencies which push for lifting democratic standards in LICs.
