The democratic transition of the 1990s expanded the number of semi-presidential countries, where an elected president exists alongside a prime minister that depends on the assembly. Many Eastern European countries chose this regime, and function now as full democracies with both a president and a prime minister. Yet, the institutional study of regimes still focuses often on the early debate of Linzian regime survival, disregarding the normalcy of institutional life in democratic regimes. I propose to look into the institutional characteristics of functioning democratic regimes. Specifically, I concentrate on the power of dissolution by presidents, in an institutional perspective that allows for regional comparison.
Presidents can dissolve parliaments under certain circumstances. It is actually a more common power than the dismissal of the prime minister. In terms of consequences, it is as radical as the dismissal of government: dissolution leads to early elections. Hence, dissolution is a relevant but scarcely studied dependent variable that provides important insight into the life of regimes.
In purely institutional terms dissolution affects the framework that guides political actors, by confirming the president as guardian of the entire system. The president is the key that unlocks the system, should there be an impasse or crisis. To sum up, the argument I try to confirm reads as follows: under certain circumstances, dissolution is a strategic weapon that presidents can use, thus balancing the distribution of power. This assumption adds to the studies of presidents, their powers, and their relation vis-à-vis the assembly.
I believe my paper will make a valuable contribution to the panel for the following reasons: through dissolution, we obtain a different but significant angle into the perception of the role of presidents. Also, we compare Western European political realities and Eastern European regimes, both according to their respective constitutions and political praxis.
