When Democracy Becomes the Benchmark: Rethinking How We Classify Regimes

Contemporary regime classification relies overwhelmingly on linear scales of democracy that implicitly treat autocracies and authoritarian regimes not as positive and conceptually complete regime types, but as residual categories defined by their deviation from democratic ideals. Across influential datasets and typologies, regimes are evaluated primarily in terms of electoral contestation, institutional constraints, and rights protection—attributes that are inherent to democratic systems but not constitutive of non-democratic rule. As a result, authoritarian and autocratic regimes are routinely conceptualized as forms of “non-democracy,” rather than analyzed for what they are, how they operate, and how they differ from one another. This paper challenges this democratic bias in regime classification and proposes an alternative framework for conceptualizing political regimes on their own terms. Building on classic regime theory and comparative insights—most notably those offered by Juan José Linz, Barbara Geddes, Johannes Gerschewski, Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, and more—the paper argues that regimes should be categorized as multidimensional constellations of power rather than as positions on a single democratic continuum. The assumption of linearity obscures meaningful variation among non-democratic regimes and collapses substantively distinct forms of rule into analytically shallow categories. The paper advances a synthetic typological framework that brings together older but underutilized regime classifications based on sources of political authority, modes of elite coordination, territorial and administrative control, ideological organization, socio-economic foundations, ruler–elite–mass relations, and similar. Rather than privileging elections as the primary yardstick, the framework treats electoral institutions as one possible—though not necessary—dimension of regime organization. This approach allows for the systematic differentiation of regimes such as personalist autocracies, military regimes, party-based authoritarian systems, theocracies, ideologically mobilized regimes, and hybrid configurations that combine multiple logics of rule. Each category within the proposed typology is paired with illustrative country cases to demonstrate how the framework could be operationalized empirically. These examples show how specific dimensions—such as elite co-optation strategies, ideological saturation, territorial penetration, or institutional personalization—can be translated into measurable indicators without reference to democratic benchmarks. The aim is not to replace existing democracy indices, but to complement them with a regime-centered classificatory logic capable of capturing variation among non-democratic systems. By re-centering regime analysis on positive attributes of power, organization, and legitimacy, the paper contributes to ongoing debates on democratic backsliding, autocratization, and regime hybridity. More broadly, it offers a foundation for comparative research that seeks to understand political regimes as structured systems in their own right, rather than as incomplete versions of democracy.