The China Reference: Unpacking the Construction of Research and Knowledge Security in the European Union

In the European Union’s (EU) pursuit of open strategic autonomy, research security has become a central debate in both academic and policy discussions. Although it is often presented as a technical response to emerging vulnerabilities such as intellectual property theft, foreign interference, and the diffusion of dual-use technologies, this article argues that research security cannot be understood as a neutral or purely technocratic concept. Rather, it shows that research security has been shaped by a distinct geopolitical reference: China. In the gradually expanding body of work on research and knowledge security, existing scholarship has predominantly approached China as the object or target of EU measures. However, little attention has been paid to the role China plays as a reference point in shaping the development and justification of the concept of research security in Europe. This research addresses this gap by investigating the role that references to China play in shaping problem definitions, risk framings, and the justificatory logic of research security across EU academic and policy debates. The article advances two core claims. First, it argues that China functions as a key anchor across European scholarship and policymaking on research security. China appears not merely as one potential partner or competitor among others, but as the implied benchmark through which risks are defined and the need for research security measures is justified. Second, this pattern challenges the technocratic character of research security. When China becomes the dominant frame of reference, debates about research security are inseparable from the broader geopolitical narratives and strategic anxieties shaping EU-China relations. While China may indeed represent a significant strategic concern for the EU, this article does not evaluate the empirical validity of such risks. Instead, it examines how China becomes the primary interpretive anchor through which research security is defined, problematized, and justified. The study analyzes a corpus of approximately 70 key documents (2017–2025), comprising peer-reviewed social science articles sourced from Scopus and Web of Science, as well as policy papers from universities and leading think tanks. The study proceeds in two phases. First, a descriptive mapping and keyword analysis provide an overview of how China and other countries appear across the corpus. Second, the study conducts a qualitative content analysis that examines how China-related framings define risks, delimit acceptable forms of cooperation, and constitute the backbone of research security. By mapping how China has shaped the European discussions on research and knowledge security, the paper offers an original contribution to the geopolitics of knowledge production. It highlights the (geo)political assumptions embedded in technical debates and explores new opportunities for critically examining how security imaginaries influence the governance of science in Europe.