The Limits of Anti-Populist Governance: Lessons from the Czech Republic and Poland

Recent elections in Central and Eastern Europe have challenged deterministic accounts of democratic backsliding. In both the Czech Republic (2021) and Poland (2023), populist incumbents were defeated through competitive elections, broad opposition coalitions, and heightened civic mobilization. These outcomes were widely interpreted as evidence of democratic resilience and the possibility of reversing autocratization through electoral means. Yet by 2025, populist actors have returned as dominant political forces: Andrej Babiš has re-emerged as a central contender in Czech politics, while in Poland right-wing populism has rapidly regrouped bringing Karol Nawrocki to the Presidency. This paper offers a comparative analysis of the Czech and Polish cases to examine why anti-populist governments struggled to consolidate their electoral victories and sustain public support. It focuses on the interaction between continuity and change in governance under anti-populist rule, highlighting three mechanisms of failure: constrained policy delivery under polarized conditions/external issues, unmet expectations - especially regarding institutional reform and accountability (both in repairing damage done by populists and preventing their return), and the persistence of populist appeals exploiting socio-economic insecurity and cultural conflict. The analysis demonstrates that electoral defeat of populists does not automatically translate into durable democratic recovery. Instead, anti-populist governance faces structural and political vulnerabilities that can facilitate rapid populist comeback. The findings contribute to broader debates on democratic resilience by showing how moments of reversal may coexist with deeper patterns of instability.