Coordination Under Constraint. Comparing Opposition Coalitions in Hungary and Turkey (2021–2023)

This paper compares opposition coordination in hybrid regimes by examining the 2023 Turkish and 2022 Hungarian parliamentary elections. Building on the article of Esen and Yavuzyilmaz (2025), who argue that regime vulnerability, power asymmetry among coalition partners, and strong leadership control hinder the effectiveness of opposition alliances, this study tests the applicability of their framework in the Hungarian context. While both cases reveal structural similarities—such as asymmetric coalitions with dominant and minor parties and the challenge of balancing ideological diversity—Hungary diverges in procedural and leadership dimensions. Drawing on the Hungarian case, the paper shows that legal-institutional incentives played a crucial role in pushing fragmented actors toward coordination. Hungary’s mixed electoral system effectively forced opposition parties to nominate a single candidate in each constituency, while state financing rules encouraged bargaining over positions among smaller parties. This structural pressure parallels Turkey’s institutional environment but diverges in the transparency and inclusiveness of coordination: whereas Turkey relied on elite negotiation within the “Table of Six,” the Hungarian six-party opposition’s electoral coalition adopted a more democratic, bottom-up process through open primaries to select its joint prime ministerial candidate. Yet these procedural innovations did not translate into electoral success. Several factors identified in the Hungarian case suggest structural limits to the model developed by Esen and Yavuzyilmaz. First, although leadership control over candidate selection was low in Hungary, the primary produced an outsider candidate, Péter Márki-Zay. He subsequently became dependent on the resources of the two largest parties in the coalition, DK and Jobbik, limiting his strategic autonomy and leading to internal policy, ideological, and material contestation within the coalition. Second, internal structural factors—such as the participation of Ferenc Gyurcsány, the country’s most rejected politician, in the coalition and Jobbik’s inability to maintain its voter base after moderation—undermined the coalition’s appeal to swing voters. To compare the two cases along the same lines, the paper develops an integrated analytical model to assess opposition effectiveness along three dimensions: actors (party and leadership dynamics), process (transparency and inclusiveness of coordination), and message (ideological coherence and campaign strategy). The Hungarian case suggests that while democratic mechanisms such as primaries may enhance legitimacy, they cannot compensate for leadership polarization, ideological incoherence, or lack of organizational unity. Thus, successful opposition coordination in hybrid regimes requires not only institutional and procedural alignment but also ideological consistency and a coherent collective character that can bridge political divisions and attract disillusioned government supporters.