From Clientelism to Coercion: How Remittances Reshape Electoral Violence in Hybrid Regimes

This paper examines how remittances reconfigure the foundations of political control in hybrid regimes. It argues that the economic autonomy generated by remittances, while weakening clientelism, triggers a strategic adaptation by threatened incumbents. In high-clientelism regimes, this adaptation involves a fundamental shift in the mode of electoral manipulation: from a politics of favor to a politics of fear. To identify this conditional effect, the analysis employs a multi-method strategy. A cross-national 2SRI model using the Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV) dataset establishes that higher remittance inflows cause increased state-led electoral violence specifically in autocratic, high-clientelism contexts. Micro- and meso-level evidence from Afrobarometer survey data across 28-33 African countries unpacks the mechanism: localities with high remittance household shares experience a pervasive climate of electoral intimidation conditional on perceptions of high clientelism, while individual recipients show no increased fear of personal targeting. This pattern confirms that incumbents resort to the collective intimidation of economically autonomous communities—applying fear as a generalized deterrent—when targeted material inducements fail. The findings illuminate how external financial flows transform the repertoire of electoral control, contributing to the "conditioned uncertainties" that characterize competition in hybrid regimes.